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1 INTRODUCTION
Superficially, human factors and ergonomics (HFE)
and human reliability analysis (HRA) appear to be—
if not identical—at least complementary fields. HFE
combines interdisciplinary elements of engineering,
psychology, and computer science, among other
fields, into a cohesive discipline (Boring, 2002).
Likewise, HRA features the cornerstones of engi-
neering and psychology, coupled with elements of
risk assessment. Despite these surface similarities,
the two fields have markedly different core areas of
focus. Specifically, whereas HFE has emerged as an
integral part of design and engineering disciplines,
HRA is an integral part of probabilistic safety as-
sessment (PSA). Therein resides the key difference
between HFE and HRA. HFE is heavily involved in
the design of novel systems, whether for usability
(Nielsen, 1993), enjoyment (Norman, 2002), or
safety (Palanque et al., 2004). HRA is focused on
verifying the safe performance of human actions, of-
ten in the context of the retrospective analysis of in-
cidents, events, or accidents (Gertman and Black-
man, 1994).
The line between HFE and HRA is blurred when
considering the design of novel safety-critical sys-
tems that must be human certified. This possibility
becomes relevant as the next generation of nuclear
power plant control rooms (Boring et al., 2005),
aerospace systems (NASA, 2005), and air traffic
control systems (Abbott et al., 2006) are designed
and deployed. Each of these fields sets a high bar
for safety—safety that meets or exceeds current
technology; at the same time, each of these fields
demands innovative human-machine interfaces that
enable the human to accomplish more in a simpler
fashion.
In some cases, the integration of HRA into HFE
is regulated. For example, NASA Procedural Re-
quirement (NPR) 8705.2A, Human-Rating Require-
ments for Space Systems (2005), identifies the proc-
ess by which a hardware or software system for
space use may become Human-Rating certified. The
Human-Rating Requirements apply to any hardware
or software space system that is developed and/or
operated by or for NASA and that supports humans
or interacts with another system that supports hu-
mans. The purpose of the Human-Rating Require-
ments is to ensure that no single system (i.e., single-
point) failure and no two inadvertent actions cause
death or permanent disability to public, crew, pas-
sengers, or ground personnel.
The present document provides guidance for HFE
practitioners to work alongside risk analysts to meet
safety goals and regulatory requirements in the de-
velopment of novel systems. By design, this docu-
ment does not rigidly specify the acceptance criteria
for a system to be considered safe or certified.
Rather, this document specifies a process that may
be followed to ensure the best achievable safety for a
novel system.
2 BASIC SAFETY DESIGN PROCESS
Development of a human-system interface (HSI)
that meets safety and human reliability goals in-
volves a phased process from conception to imple-
mentation. Safety is demonstrated through three
successive phases that should be treated with inde-
pendent milestones and objectives. Phase I, which
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consists of the conceptual or specification phase of
system development, should outline not only desir-
able system features but also planned compliance to
applicable safety standards throughout the lifecycle
of the system. This phase may include setting safety
objectives in terms of HRA such as, for example, the
maximum acceptable human error probability of 1E-
3 for any single action. Phase II, which is the pre-
liminary design or prototype phase, is most closely
associated with HFE, in that initial designs are pro-
totyped and tested prior to product implementation.
In this phase, HRA may be used to produce evidence
that the safety objectives have been met. During
Phase II, the HFE engineer also identifies and re-
views critical functions for system operation and
personnel safety. Phase III corresponds to the actual
implementation of the HSI. During the phase, the
HFE engineer compiles a description of the critical
function performance criteria through analysis, test-
ing, inspection, and documentation.
3 ACHIEVING CERTIFICATION
As noted previously, some HRA-infused HFE serves
specific regulatory requirements. At what point has
the HSI reached the acceptable, safe level of human
reliability? Regulatory approval or certification may
occur at any or all of the three phases. The guidance
documents overviewed in the certification process
(e.g., the NASA Human-Rating Requirements) typi-
cally provide proven methods to model, design, test,
and validate safety-critical HSI. Because of the di-
versity of systems and applications, it is also be-
yond the scope of the requirements to specify the
point at which any given system may be certified. It
is for this reason that a safety process, as prescribed
here, can help ensure safety considerations have been
adequately addressed in the HFE process.
In some cases, where safety considerations are
not practicable, waivers or deviations may be
granted. These waivers or deviations may only be
granted if best achievable safety levels have been
met and there is a strong basis for the waiver or de-
viation such as technical infeasibility or reasonable
cost limitations of the system. Importantly, a waiver
or deviation does not obviate the need to meet best
achievable safety levels. A waiver or deviation, in
fact, certifies that every feasible and reasonable step
has been taken to ensure the safety of those humans
who come in contact with the HSI.
Neither infusing HRA into the HFE process nor
achieving certification guarantees that a system is
actually safe in all cases. A carefully designed and
reviewed system may fail to consider all possible
scenarios that could contribute to human error or un-
safe interaction with a system. The literature is rife
with examples of incidents, events, and accidents
that resulted from otherwise well designed systems
but that failed to consider the full spectrum of possi-
ble safety-degrading scenarios with which the users
of those systems would be confronted (Johnson,
2003). The inability to predict such scenarios is at
the heart of resilience engineering (Hollnagel, 2006).
Resilience in this sense embarks upon the task of an-
ticipating risks, even in the face of unpredictable and
dynamic circumstances. One key to this approach is
to avoid using predefined sets of risks (e.g., risk cut-
sets as used in PSAs) in designing and certifying a
safe system. Rather, the goal of a resilient safety
process is to understand the human response in the
face of risks. The process proposed in this paper is
congruent with resilience engineering in that it pro-
poses an integrative and iterative merger of design,
testing, and modeling. This approach can be used to
address specific pre-defined risks according to regu-
latory guidelines. It can, however, also be used to
develop a conceptual understanding of how humans
using a particular system respond to off-normal or
suboptimal scenarios. Such insights extend beyond
addressing pre-defined risks; rather, they provide a
catalog of human actions and inactions—both safe
and unsafe—and a basis for mitigating unsafe ac-
tions and enhancing safe actions.
4 BEST ACHIEVABLE PRACTICES
In this section, I outline steps that may be used
to guide the best achievable practices in safety-
critical HFE. These steps may also help achieve
safety goals and acceptance criteria for certification.
The factors that determine the best achievable safety
practices include HFE design, testing, and modeling,
and together comprise the System Development
Safety Triptych. Note that design and testing are
largely the domain of traditional HFE, while model-
ing adds HRA considerations. It is the union of hu-
man factors design and testing with human reliability
modeling that can help realize best achievable safety
in the product development process. Note that
these considerations are not prescriptive of a norma-
tive model of design for safety. They serve merely
as suggestions gleaned from the author’s observa-
tions in integrating HFE and HRA.
4.1 Best Achievable Practices for Design
The following practices, including hardware and
software engineering, may facilitate safety-critical
design.
• Compliance with applicable standards and best
practices documents. Applicable standards will
vary according to the specific system that is be-
ing designed. Where applicable, ANSI, ASME,
IEEE, ISO, or other discipline-specific standards
and best practices should be followed carefully.
Table 1. The System Development Safety Triptych of design, testing, and modeling.
Design Testing Modeling
(Including hardware and
software engineering)
(including equipment and
human subject testing)
(including PSA, HRA, and
simulations)
• Compliance with applica-
ble standards and best
practices documents
• Controlled studies that
avoid confounds or ex-
perimental artifacts
• Compliance with applica-
ble standards and best
practices documents
• Consideration of system
usability and human fac-
tors
• Use of maximally realistic
and representative sce-
narios, users, and/or con-
ditions
• Use of established model-
ing techniques
• Iterative design-test-
redesign-retest cycle
• Use of humans-in-the-loop
testing
• Validation of models to
available operational data
• Tractability of design deci-
sions
• Use of valid metrics such
as statistically significant
results for acceptance cri-
teria
• Completeness of modeling
scenarios at the correct
level of granularity
• Verified reliability of de-
sign solutions
• Documented test design,
hypothesis, manipulations,
metrics, and acceptance
criteria
• Realistic model end states
Where deviation is necessary due to the unique
nature of particular systems, these deviations
should be clearly documented and justified.
• Consideration of system usability and human
factors. If the system that is being designed will
be used by a human, it should be designed ac-
cording to usability and human factors standards
such as NASA-STD-3000, MIL-STD-1472, and
ISO 9241. The system should be ergonomically
designed to facilitate the user’s natural physical
interaction with the system. Where applicable,
this consideration includes unique environmental
considerations such as human-system interaction
in a weightless environment. The system should
be designed to be maximally usable in terms of
the quality of the software or hardware interface.
Best practices regarding the use of display, inter-
face, and control design should be followed and
documented. In terms of safety-critical certifica-
tion, the primary emphasis of usability and hu-
man factors is on ensuring that the use of a sys-
tem does not disrupt critical functions or
compromise the safety of the user or other hu-
mans.
Systems that are not directly used by humans but
that may interact with human-occupied systems
(HOS) should ensure that the non HOS will not
change or disrupt the normal human-system in-
teraction of the HOS.
• Iterative design-test-redesign-retest cycle. The
complement of good design is testing the first-
effort design and applying lessons learned in the
refinement of the design. Where feasible, sys-
tem design should be tested to identify potential
issues in terms of critical functions. Compliance
with design standards does not guarantee a sys-
tem optimized for human safety. Iterative test-
ing and redesign of a system throughout the de-
sign lifecycle helps demonstrate safety in the
design.
• Tractability of design decisions. Where deci-
sions have been made that could affect the criti-
cal functions of the system, these decisions
should be clearly documented. Design decisions
that could adversely impact critical functions
under any circumstances must be justified. As
well, all safety considerations should be docu-
mented (e.g., the system component may fail un-
der unusual circumstances; however, a different
system component ensures the viability of the
personnel while repairs can be made). This de-
sign rationale may serve as the basis for waivers
or deviations from certification.
Documentation of design decisions that enhance
critical functions serves to facilitate the safety
goals and certification process.
• Verified reliability of design solutions. The reli-
ability of systems should be documented through
vendor data, cross-reference to the operational
history of similar existing systems, and/or test
results. A system’s reliability may be modeled
through a composite of sub-component reliabil-
ity data, but whole-system testing is generally
preferable. Acceptable reliability levels should
be identified and agreed upon early in the design
process. It is especially important to project sys-
tem reliability throughout the system lifecycle,
including considerations for maintenance once
the system has been deployed. It is also impor-
tant to incorporate the estimated mean time be-
fore failure into the estimated life of the system.
4.2 Best Achievable Practices for Testing
The following testing practices, including equipment
and human subject testing, may facilitate the overall
safety of the system.
• Controlled studies that avoid confounds or ex-
perimental artifacts. Testing of system designs
should be accomplished using rigorous experi-
mental methods specific to the application and
system. Testing may include hardware reliabil-
ity testing, HSI usability evaluation, and soft-
ware debugging. Testing should avoid situations
that could lead to ambiguous results, such as
when alternate causal explanations (e.g., con-
founds) or an unrealistic experimental design
(e.g., experimental artifacts) come into play.
• Use of maximally realistic and representative
scenarios, users, and/or conditions. To the ex-
tent feasible, testing should involve a real-time,
closed-loop test environment. The testing sce-
narios and conditions should reflect the range of
actions the system will experience in actual use,
including possible worst-case situations. Simi-
larly, human subject testing should involve users
who are representative of the actual system users
under environmental factors and situations char-
acteristic of the expected usage.
• Use of humans-in-the-loop testing. A system
that will be used by humans should always be
tested by humans. Per the previous point, the
human subjects should be representative of ac-
tual users. All human subject testing should
carefully follow and document safety and ethics
standards for treatment of human participants.
Hazardous environments should be simulated to
the extent feasible and safe for testing purposes.
• Use of valid metrics such as statistically signifi-
cant results for acceptance criteria. Testing
should be measured using methods appropriate
to the discipline. Where feasible, the metrics
should reflect system or user performance across
the entire range of expected circumstances. In
many cases, testing will involve use of a statisti-
cal sample evaluated against a pre-defined ac-
ceptance (e.g., alpha) level for “passing” the test.
Inferential statistics are preferable to descriptive
statistics. Inferential statistical analyses should
clearly define the acceptance level (e.g.,  
0.001). Care should be taken to ensure proper
statistical power and to avoid Type I errors (i.e.,
false positives).
• Documented test design, hypothesis, manipula-
tions, metrics, and acceptance criteria. A well
documented test plan is crucial in the initial
phases of the safety design process. This test
plan should include the test design, hypothesis
(or hypotheses), manipulations, metrics, and ac-
ceptance criteria. Subsequent testing should
closely follow this test plan and document any
required deviations from the test plan. In the
event that a system fails to meet the identified
acceptance criteria during testing, a redesign and
additional testing should be undertaken before
proceeding with final implementation.
4.3 Best Achievable Practices for Modeling
The following modeling practices, including PSA,
HRA, and simulations, may facilitate the overall
safety of the system.
• Compliance with applicable standards and best
practices documents. Regulatory and standards
agencies provide guidance across the domains of
PSA—e.g., NASA NPR 8705.5, Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA
Programs and Projects (2004)—and HRA—e.g.,
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-
1792, Good Practices for Implementing Human
Reliability Analysis (2005). Specific modeling
techniques with established histories will typi-
cally have documentation to outline best prac-
tices. Where deviation is necessary due to the
unique nature of particular systems, these devia-
tions should be clearly documented and justified.
• Use of established modeling techniques. Within
PSA, HRA, and simulation modeling, many es-
tablished and novel techniques exist. For certifi-
cation purposes, it is better to use an existing,
vetted method than to make use of novel tech-
niques and methods that have not been estab-
lished within a particular industry. Modeling
tools and techniques should be documented early
in the safety design process to ensure concur-
rence by review agencies.
• Validation of models to available operational
data. To ensure a realistic modeling representa-
tion, models must be baselined to data obtained
from empirical testing or actual operational data.
Such validation increases the veracity of model
extrapolations to novel domains. For example, if
a system component has been tested in a particu-
lar environment and a simulation model accu-
rately reflects performance in that environment,
it may be acceptable to extrapolate the model to
a novel environment in which the component has
never been tested but in which the performance
parameters are predicted to follow a well under-
stood pattern. Note that it is generally preferable
to conduct an actual test on novel performance
situations rather than to model that performance.
• Completeness of modeling scenarios at the cor-
rect level of granularity. Modeling scenarios
should cover the complete range of operating
scenarios with reasonable concession for the
possibility of negative outcomes. A thorough
task analysis, a review of relevant past operating
experience, and a review by subject matter ex-
perts help to ensure the completeness of the
model.
The appropriate level of task decomposition or
granularity should be determined according to
the modeling method’s requirement, the fidelity
required to model success and failure outcomes,
specific requirements of the system that is being
designed, and guidance provided by regulatory
boards, as appropriate. Every step or action that
can affect system success and personnel safety
should be modeled. Where steps or actions are
logically related, they may be clustered as a sin-
gle step or action, provided this grouping does
not mask opportunities for failure or recovery
steps.
• Realistic model end states. A PSA or HRA
model or simulation must provide a realistic set
of situations to which it is modeled. The end
states should reflect reasonable and realistic out-
comes across the range of operating scenarios.
These end states should reflect possible negative
outcomes such as system failure. Negative out-
comes should always ensure the opportunity for
reasonable recovery of humans interacting with
that system.
5 BEST ACHIEVABLE PRACTICES ACROSS
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PHASES
Table 2 outlines how the best achievable practices
for design, testing, and modeling may be imple-
mented across the safety design process. In Phase I,
the planned use or implementation of best achiev-
able practices is documented. In Phase II, the actual
use or implementation of these practices is docu-
mented. Finally, in Phase III, the results or products
across design, testing, and modeling are docu-
mented. At each phase of the safety design process,
the HFE design team should carefully review the
progress in meeting the dual goals of best achievable
safety practices and usable product design.
At the end of the safety design process, the HFE
design team and/or a regulatory agency may review
the quality of the overall design in terms of safety.
The responsible parties should determine one of
three possible outcomes for the system:
• Unsafe. If the system has failed to meet best
achievable practices and the specific safety re-
quirements set forth by the team or the regulator,
the system should not be considered safe without
redesign efforts.
• Waiver or Deviation. If the system has met best
achievable practices but cannot reasonably or re-
alistically meet the specific safety requirements
set forth by the team or the regulator, the system
may receive a waiver or deviation from the
original safety plan or the certification process.
• Safe. If the system has met best achievable prac-
tices and the specific safety requirements set
forth by the team or the regulator, the system
may be considered safe within the specified
safety parameters.
6 DISCUSSION
The System Development Safety Triptych process
outlined in this document is illustrative of the value
of fusing HFE with HRA. Traditional HFE in-
volvement in the development process encompasses
design and testing. While these phases help ensure
safe systems, they do not individually or collectively
meet all the considerations of a safe system. When
augmented with modeling considerations of HRA
and PSA, however, they can more effectively meet
safety goals and regulatory and certification re-
quirements. Similarly, HRA and PSA, when omit-
ting the design and testing contributions of HFE, can
fail to provide the input essential to designing and
validating a safe system. It is the interplay of both
HFE and HRA that most effectively leads to safe,
even certifiably safe, systems.
7 DISCLAIMER
This paper represents the author’s interpretation of a
process that may address safety and design require-
ments. The author is not affiliated with US or inter-
Table 2. Best achievable practices for safety across development phases.
national regulatory agencies and has neither implied
nor explicit endorsement by such agencies for
thework presented in this paper. This research was
carried out by Idaho National Laboratory, a US De-
partment of Energy laboratory operated by Battelle
Energy Alliance. This report was prepared as an ac-
count of work sponsored by an agency of the US
Government. Neither the US Government nor any
agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes
any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any le-
gal liability or responsibility for any third party’s
use, or the results of such use, of any information,
apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this re-
port, or represents that its use by such third party
would not infringe privately owned rights.
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